coming into physical contact 6 with a sacred place the suppliant is somewhat incorporated in the sanctity of the place, becoming in a sense property of the god. "1 give my body as sacred property to the god to have," as Kreousa puts it (1. 1285: iEpàv 'tà crrollcx 'tep flEep Ùtùroll' ËxEtv) .7 This rule knows no exceptions. The altar is an "unbreakable shield, stronger than a fortification wall", the "abode of the gods a protection common to aIl men", to use the words of Aischylos (Hiket., 190) and Euripides (Herakl., 260) respectively.8 Considerations of sin, guilt, right, and justice have no bearing on the daim of a suppliant to remain in the sanctuary or to be delivered to his pursuers. In Euripides' Herakleidai O. [236] [237] [238] [239] [240] [241] [242] [243] [244] [245] [246] the Athenian king Demophon presents the reasons for accepting the suppliants, who had taken refuge in the sanctuary of Zeus Agoraios: kinship, the obligation to repaya good service, the personal and political shame of Athens, respect to Zeus' altar. 9 Demophon makes no allowance for whatever may have caused the Herakleids to seek asylum. Beside the evidence of Athenian drama, collected and discussed recently by J. Mikalson (note 2), this attitude is confirmed by legal sources. Lysias, e.g., describing how the 30 tyrants in Athens siezed their victims from the altars, comments: "Because of their behaviour you have found no shelter from your wrongs (àùlKouIlÉvouç) in either temples or altars, which save even the wrongdoers ('tDîç àÙlKOÛcrt).,, 10 The question of morality and justice is not raised in the extant leges sacrae on supplication.
ll A decree of Tralleis, confirmed in the 4th century by a Persian 6 On the ritual of supplication see J. GOULD, Hiketela, inJHS, 93 (1973), p. 74-103, esp. 75-85: cf SCHLESINGER, op. cit. (n. 4 107/108 (1994-1995) , 1, p. 51-75 (= Sphalros. Hans Schwabl zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet). king, establishing the asylia Cinviolability) and hiketeria (the right to accept suppliants) of the sanctuary of Dionysos Bakchios, protects the iviolability of every suppliant, regardless of the reason he sought divine protection: 12 "Nobody should wrong a suppliant... Nobody should either wrong a suppliant or remain indifferent when he sees a suppliant beeing wronged; otherwise let him and his whole stock be destroyed."
The blind and indifferent application of this rule might clearly lead to problems. The presence of suppliants in a sanctuary could easily jeopardize a city's safety, since criminal elements and persons willing to do anything in their despair could be among them; even if the fugitives were innocent victims of injustice their presence in a city would provoke their pursuer's enmity.13 This phenomenon couId also undermine the political authority and the authority of secular law: Can a community tolerate that native and foreign murderers, thieves, runaway slaves, traitors, and debtors find safety, impunity, or release from the burden of their debts in a sanctuary? And if runaway slaves had some justification for their escape, claiming to be the victims of cruel treatment, what about already convicted criminals, found guilty by secular courts, as was the case of Kreousa, convicted for her crime Cl. 1251: ",~<pcp Kpoetlleetcr'), but safe in the god's adyta. Ion's criticism is not unique. In Euripides' lost tragedy Oedipus Cfr. 1049 N) an anonymous speaker in an unknown context expresses the same conflict between secular authority Cthe authority of a court) and the divine law protecting, invariably, asylia: "When a man who is unjust sits at an altar, l would bid the tradition farewell and, not fearing the gods, would take him off to court. A bad man ought always to suffer badly".14 Until the 2nd century A.D. similar accusations are not uncommon in the literary sources, especially in relation to the sanctuaries of Asia Minor Ce.g., the Attemision at Ephesos), where according that these leges sacrae may concern the purification of homicides (p. 57f. 29 (1978) , p. 144f.; 1. SOVERINl, Il "commerclo nel tempio": Osservazloni sul regolamento dei kapèlol a Samo (SEC XXVII, 545) , in Opus, 9-10 (1990-1991), p. 75-77, 84 . For supplication provoking the pursuer's attack see, e.g., the aforementioned story of Paktyes and the evidence in Attic drama: SCHLESINGER, op. cif. (n. 4 This inherent conflict between divine and secular authority became increasingly apparent as and wherever the state institutions grew and developed, and the solution of legal conflicts became less a matter of private reprisaIs and arbitration and more an issue of public courts. Athenian drama often reflects this conflict between secular and religious authority, Sophokles' Antigone being the best known play with such a theme, but hardly the only example. 16 Here, asylia will present a case study for this kind of conflicts. This particular issue was not a conflict between magistracies, since in the Greek polis no sharp distinction between secular and religious offices existed, the priests being in most cases elected officiaIs of the community. It was primarily a conflict between an unwritten custom, transmitted from generation to generation and regarded as a divine command, on the one hand, and legal regulations introduced in a relatively late period, on the other. The evidence quoted so far shows that the Greeks had realized the problem, whose dimensions should not be underestimated. As Ulrich Sinn has recently demonstrated, we must assume that from the classical period on large numbers of suppliants ran to Greek sanctuaries and sometimes remained there for a long time, so that installations for their lodging became necessary.17 This paper, however, concerns itself with the 15 STRAB., XIV, 1, 23: ... 'Av~rov(ou Bè Btll"'acnacrav~oç toÛto (sc., the inviolable area) lCal crUI.l1lept"'OE~ÔVtoÇ 'tfj àcru"'(q; JlÉpoç n~f\ç llô",eroç' Ècpavll Bè~oû~o~"'a~epov lCal È1l1~oîç lCalCoupyotç llotoÛṼ~v llÔ",tV; TAC., Ann., III, 60 Bruxelles, 1964, p. 222-225, no. 82 SINN, mt. cif. (n. 4), 77, [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] [88] [89] [90] [91] [92] [93] [94] [95] [96] [97] [106] [107] [108] [109] [110] München, 1964, p. 48-85 . According to a restoration of a decree of Kastabos (P.M. FRASER -G.E. BEAN, 77Je Rhodian Perala and Islands, London, 1954, p. 24-27, no. 15 Paris, 1991, p. 68-72 no. 44. measures Greek poleis took not in order to provide lodging to suppliants, but in arder to get rid of them.
The epigraphic and literary evidence assembled here 18 shows that the Greeks tried in many ways to escape from the embarassing situation of people evading the grasp of secular law by appealing to an old and unalterable tradition. In the changing world of the archaic polis the idea of unlimited asylia presented a relie of an old notion of guilt, for which intention and planning played no rôle and only the concrete deed counted. This idea was difficult to accomodate with a new concept of justice which prevailed increasingly from the late 7th century. The introduction of a new, differentiated notion of guilt, which distinguished between intention and accident, had significant effeets on two central areas of ancient religiosity, i.e., asylia and miasma. Asylia on the one hand was increasingly regarded as the right of victims of injustice; for miasma, not only the deed, but also the thought became increasingly important. Yet, despite these tendencies and developments the persistence of sacred law prevented the formulation of dear, unequivocal, generally applicable rules for the acceptance or rejection of daims of supplication. This conflict of authority was not solved after aIl. In this paper l concentrate on the wOrld of the Greek poleis, leaving aside Hellenistic or Roman regulations, where the problem was seen in a different way due to the different structures of power and the different traditions. 19 The most obvious solution was of course simply to violate asylia, hoping that the gods would turn a blind eye to the violation, especially if the pursued persan was clearly a criminal. After aIl, the gods were the only guarantors of asylia. Until the Hellenistic age there is no evidence for a legal procedure against persons who had violated asylia. 20 Given the lack of a legal protection of asylia, staries about the violent removal of suppliants from altars and sanctuaries are not uncommon, but our sources never neglegt ta stigmatize these instances of sacrilege and to interpret any misfortune that befell the violator in the future as expression of the divine anger. 21 If the victims of the violation happened to be innocent, this only made things worse; but the violation of asylia was condemned even if the suppliants were convicts or criminals. Equally common as the violation of asylia is the effort to get around it deceitfully, e.g., by interrupting the physical contact between the suppliants and the sacred place or by forcing the suppliants to leave the sanctuary by burning them out, walling them up, prohibitting their food supply, or simply promising to give them a fair trial or guarantee a safe departure and then seizing and killing them. 22 Sometimes, negotiations served bath parties, securing for the suppliants, especially debtors, a better treatment, and permitting the authoriÙes to save face. 23 One of these methods, the prohibition of food supply (especially to runaway slaves), was institutionalized in sorne sanctuaries in the Hellenistic age, i.e., in Andania and Samos ( § 4 and note 58).
True, it was often easier to apply tricks than to introduce c1ear legallimitations of asylia. Despite the fact that the Greeks were conscious of the problem that asylia could be exploited by criminal elements and despite the occasional criticism, they were extremely reluctant to introduce c1ear, direct, and unambiguous limitations. deal with the problem: a) by prohibiting persans most likely ta seek asylum, e.g., convieted and polluted persans, from entering a sanctuary in the first place ( § 2); b) by having measures against suppliant wrongdoers confirmed by the gods through oracles ( § 3); and c) by conferring on the religious personnel the authority ta expell suppliant slaves ( § 4).
Prohibitions against unwelcome intruders in sanctuaries and the case of the àyroyt~ot
The evidence for measures excluding from sanctuaries persans who might try ta escape the grasp of law is primarily Attie. A fragmentary Attie decree (ca. 432/1) related ta works on the Acropolis 24 provides for the building of a wall, sa that neither runaway slaves nor thieves couId enter the sanctuary (hoIt [oç] âv opcmÉtEç Ilè è[at]ët ll110è ÀOItOO{lt [EÇ] ). The work was ta be carried out within two months, and three archers were ta be set there as guards. Already B.W. Lolling has pointed out that the runaway slaves and thieves were ta be kept out of the Acropolis, sa that they would not seek asylum there. 25 We should notice the silence of this decree as ta the fate of fugitives and criminals, who did manage ta get into the sanctuary. Were they beyond the responsibility of the Athenian authorities, or were at least the priests allowed ta expell these intruders from the sanctuary (see infra § 4)?
As we may infer from Attie forensie speeches some categories of conviets were excluded from sanctuaries. It should be underlined here that these provisions aimed primarily at protecting the sanctuaries from pollution, and not at prohibiting the exploitation of asylia. Andokides makes an allusion ta an Attie law whieh forbade persans convieted as atimoi ta enter sanctuaries. Death would be the penalty of violators (OÙK È~Éatal aùter Eiç ta iEpav to'iv OEo'iV EicrtÉVat àItOOavE'itat); obviously, supplication could not save them. 26 A similar impediment is mentioned in Lysias' speach against Andokides (VI, 24). A decree passed by the Athenians provided that Andokides was ta be barred from the marketplace and the temples, sa that even if wronged by his enemies he could get no redress (Kat ItpOaEljI11CPtaaaOal \lIlE'iÇ aùtav EïpyecrOat tfjç àyopâç Kat trov iEProv, matE 11110' àOIKOUIlEVOV \lIta trov ÈXOprov ouvaaOal OtK:11v Àa~EÎv). Bere, the ad hoc regulation aimed at depriving Andokides from the protection of asylia. Analogous laws prohibited men who failed ta take the field, deserters, coward men, and women engaged in adultery ta enter public sanctuaries. Analogous regulations can be found outside Attica. Narrating one of the attrocities in Sparta after the death of Kleomenes, the butchering of ephors in the sanctuaty of Athena Chalkioikos, Polybios 28 stretches the fact that this particular sanctuaty secured the safety even of persons condemned to death CiCaltOln<xcrt 'toîç lCa'ta<puyoûcrt 't~v ucr<paÀElaV napEm(EÛaSE 'to iEp6v, lC&V 9ava'tou 'ttç li lCa'talCElCptIlÉVoÇ), thus indicating that this was not the general rule,z9 There were obviously some sanctuaries, at least at his time, which did not offer safety ta persons condemned to death. We should mention in this context the amphictionic decree of 346/45 against the defeated Phokians after the Third Sacred War, accarding to which the fugitive Phokians as weIl as any other persan who had participated in the plundering of the sanctuaty were to be arrested wherever they might be (uyroytllOt nav'to9Ev).3 Ü F. von WoeB has pointed out that in the Ptolemaic documentaty material the ward uyroytlloç is used as a synonym of 'deprived of asylia' ("auch ohne Asylschutz") and assumed that this clause aimed at depriving the persons involved in the Delphic sacrilege from the protection of asyla.
31 This is, however, not certain. The same clause is found in the decree proposed by Aristokrates for the mercenaty leader Charidemos in 352 B.C. (Demosth., XXIII, 34: €av 'ttç unolC'tElVn XapîolllloV, uyroytlloç €cr'tO) nav'tax6eEV); as Demosthenes explains, here uyroytlloç €cr'tO) naV'tax69Ev means liable to seizure elsewhere than in Athenian territoty (XXIII, 35: nÀ~v Èv 'tft l,IlEOanft, uyroytllov ÈlC 'tftç crullllaxîooç nacrllç).
In the light of these regulations, we may understand properly a Hellenistic tex sacra from Eresos concerning itself with ritual purity.3
2 The text lists the persons not allowed to enter a sanctuaty: impious people (cf 1. 1: dcr'tElXEtV EùcrEpÉaç), persons polluted by death, birth, and sexual intercourse O'. 2-9).
Excluded were also perhaps killers (not necessarilly murderers)33 and certainly traitors (1. la: [<povÉaç?] oÈ Il~dcr'tElXEtv 1l110È npo80'tatç). The prohibition against killers, if this restoration should be correct, can easily be explained in terms of pollution. The exclusion of traitors is mare problematic. The nature of their treacherous behaviour Ctowards their friends or their countty) is not specified. GieBen, 1910, p. 120 ; on the exclusion of foreigners from sanctuaries see Infra, n. 36. "shamelessness that causes them ta disregard normal constraints.,,34 It is, therefore, concievable that the primary aim of this regulation was to protect the sanctuary from pollution. However, whatever its origin may have been, in effect it excluded from entrance, and consequently from protection in the sacred precinct, two groups of persans most likely to seek asylum there, killers and traitors, Le., persans prosecuted by the families of their victims, by secular authorities, or by political opponents.
As we have seen, there is sorne evidence that persans who were legally prosecuted, or even condemned, were not allowed to enter a sacred precinct. The preoccupation with pollution most probably explains these measures against convicts and criminals, as it explains, for instance, measures against lodging in sanctuaries. 35 But even if the primary aim of these regulations was not to prohibit the exploitation of an asylon by criminals, their result was after aIl the exclusion of these people from the area protected by the asylia. We should note here that there exists another group of prohibitions which are nat related ta asylia, but still could Ctheoretically) be used ta keep outside a sanctuary potential suppliants: l mean regulations prohibiting the entrance of foreigners in certain sanctuaries. 36 Since most asylum seekers were foreigners to the place where they sought protection Ce.g., victims of civil strife and wars), these clauses effectively denied them entrance to the sanctuaries.
The aforementioned provisions most likely couId provide the authorities with an excuse to lay hands on certain suppliants after they had entered the sanctuary and approached the altars. Obviously, charges of crimes committed within the inviolable area could also be used as excuses for the expulsion of suppliants. A story goes, e.g., that the philosopher Menedemos of Eretria, who was living as a suppliant in the Amphiareion at Oropos, was compelled to leave the sanctuary through a decree of the Boiotian league; sorne golden goblets were missing, and the philosopher was accused of stealing them. ID 68, A and B, in BCH, 118 (1994) , p. 69-98 demonstrates that the latter prohibition concerns the Archegesion of Delos; she suggests that it was primarily addressed against the Athenians (ca. 404-394 or 386-377 B.e.).
37 DrOG. LAERT., II, 142: Kat ÔIÉtplpev Èv 'QpC01t0 Èv t0 tO\) 'Acpuxpeco ieP0' Ëv9a xpuarov 1tOt1]plCOV Ù1toÀoJ.\Évcov, Ka9a cpacrlv "EpJ.\I1t1tOÇ, ô6YJ.1atl KOIV0 trov BOlcotrov ÈKeÀeucr91l J.\eteÀgeîv. a huge difference between excuses and legitimacy. The dilemma remained. Could a secular regulation (a law or a decree) violate an unequivocal divine law which protected al! suppliants, without causing the anger of gods? And this is hardly the only problem. The lex sacra from Eresos prohibited traitors from entering the sanctuary, But who decides who is a traitor and how? What one regards treason is certainly interpreted differently by the alleged traitor. Since the latter did not have the right to enter the sanctuary in the first place, we may assume that his pursuers would have an excuse to drag him out without the fear of provoking the gods' anger. But could the accused person still defend himself?
Suspension of the suppliant's status through oracles
This question brings us to the second possible solution, Le., the oracular approval of measures against suppliants. We have seen already that Kyme had tried to shift the responsibility of a decision in the case of Paktyes ta the oracle of Didyma. 38 There is more and better evidence for this procedure.
The most enigmatic inscription of Arkadia, the 'Gottesurteil von Mantineia' (ca. 460),39 may be related to a procedure against suppliants. This text consists of a list of persons convicted for the murder of several men and a girl in the sanctuary of Alea and a dossier of documents related to the judicial procedure against them. Since this text has been most recently the object of an exhaustive study by G. Thür and H. Taeuber, who also offer a detailed presentation of previous interpretations, 1 will discuss here only the implications of this document for asylia, focusing on the few certain points of the document.
The inscription begins with the names of thirteen (according ta Thür and Taeuber) or twelve (according to 1. Dubois) men convicted for killing sorne men and a girl in the sanctuary of Athena Alea (1, 1-13, cf 1. [25] [26] [27] [28] . According to Thür's persuasive interpretation the instructions for the trial (with the charge and a reference to the legal consequnces in case of conviction) are stated at the end of the inscription. 4ü These instructions distinguish between a defendant who is mentioned by name (Themandros) and a group of anonymous defendants. The instructions for both groups follow exactly the same pattern, as shown bellow (the differences are underlined): 38 SINN, art, cft. (n. 4) One of the many controversial issues related ta this text is the question as ta whether the phrase 'in the sanctuary' in the instructions for the trial against the anonymous defendants (Et crtç iv roiepoî tOV tÔtE [à1tuSo;vôVtov] ljlovÉç Ècrn) modifies the participle à1tuSo;vôv'tOv (as is the case in the instructions for the trial of Themandros, Le., "if anyone is the murderer of those who were killed then in the sanctuary") or the pronoun crtç (Le., "if anyone of the men in the sanctuary is the murderer of those who were killed then,,).41 At first sight the correspondence of the formulations used in the two instructions (Et crtç iv tOiEpoî tOV tÔtE [à1tuSo;vôVtov] ljlovÉç Ècrn -d 0ÉI.lo;vôpOç ljlovÉç Ècrn E[tcrE] tOV àvôpov EtcrE tâç ljlo;pSÉv'[o] tOV tÔtE à1tuSo;vôv'tOv iv tl;> [iEpoî]) seems to speak for the first interpretation. However, the correspondence is not so close: In the first instruction the phrase 'in the sanctuary' pecedes the participle à1tuSo;VôVtOV, in the second instruction it follows. Furthermore, G. Thür has argued that if we accept the latter translation C'anyone of the men in the sanctuary'), the reason that a different procedure had to be followed for the anonymous defendants (in the sanctuary) and Themandros becomes apparent. The two different procedures are due precisely ta the fact that aIl the other murderers, along with members of their families, had sought asylum in the sanctuary after their deed, whereas Themandros did not. Thür's interpretation can be strengthened by sorne further significant differences between the two instructions: 42 a) in the case of Themandros there is no reference ta an oracle (Kà] tO XPEcrtÉpWV); b) the instruction for Themandros mentions the possibility (probably Themandros' allegation) that Themandros was only present in the sanctuary (1tpocrcrSo;YEVÉÇ), either during the murder or at a different point,43 but was not one of the murderers. Both differences can be explained if we accept Thür's interpre- tation. For Themandros' trial no reference to an oracle was necessary, since he was not a suppliant. He could be tried according to the city's laws on homicide. Gnly he, the only defendant who did not seek asylum in the sanctuary after the incident, could claim that he was not present in the sanctuary during the killings (or according to a different understanding of the word npocrcrSayevÉç, that he was only an eyewitness). 44 Three further enigmas of this inscription can also be answered if we follow Thür's line of interpretation. First, the only legal consequences of the conviction mentioned in the text are confiscation of property (1. 15-17: 'tov XpelllX'tOV ne 'toîç F0tlCtlX'tat(ç) 'tâç Seo ÈVat ICcX FotlCtaç McracrcrSat 'tcXç av 0 ù' èOEcraç; 1. 19-20: ànucreùOlltv[OÇ] 'tov xpella'tOv 'ta Àaxoç) and expulsion from the sanctuary for both the convicts and all their male descendants O, 20-21: ùnexolltVoÇ ICcX 'toppÉv'tepov yÉvoç ÈVat alla'ta nav'ta ùnù 'toî iepoî), truelly a peculiar punishment for 'normal' murderers. Second, the goddess is mentioned explicitly among the recipients of the confiscated property O, 15-17; cf 1. 1: [Fo] <pÀÉacrt o'{ùe iv 'AÀÉav);45 she received aH the movable property, whereas the immovables were to be distributed, probably among the relatives of the victims. This provision clearly indicates that the crime committed had wronged the goddess, too. And third, the various documents quoted in this dossier make allusion to two separate convictions of the defendants: a) through the goddess by means of an oracle, and b) by judges, probably through votes O, 14-15: ocrÉOt /Xv xpecr'tÉpov ICa'taICptve g yvocrtat ICaICptSÉe; 1. 18-19: Ènt 'toîù' ÈÙtJC(xcrallev li 'te Seaç ICcXÇ oi ÙtICacrcr'tat; cf 1. [18] [19] 'ta xpecr'tÉpwv).46 The peculiarities~ith which the text confronts us (involvement of the goddess as victim, plaintiff, and recipient of the fine, exclusion of the convicts and their descendants from the sanctuary) cannot be fully explained simply by attributing them to the fact that the murders were committed in the sacred precinct or that the victims may have been suppliants. 47 These peculiarities, together with the different procedure followed for Themandros, suggest the foHowing (admittedly speculative) scenario. Several men committed murders in the sanctuary of Alea. While the murderers -except for Themandros-were enjoying the benefits of asylia in the sanctuary, the families of their victims were crying out for revenge. The community of Mantineia was divided and powerless, while the priests saw themselves confronted with the bizarre situation of offering protection to men who had polluted the sanctuary by committing murders in the sacred precinct. Precisely this gave the solution to the problem. If the murderers could not be charged with murder by the secular authorities or by the families of the victims, they could be charged by the goddess for their sacrilege. Their conviction meant their exclusion from the sanctuary, Le., terminated their status as suppliants (cf the aforementioned anecdote about Menedemos, note 37). Themandros, who was not in the sanctuary, was also convicted on the same charge, and his name appears along with the names of the others.
Such consultation of an oracle is not unique. An analogous interaction between an oracle and secular authorities is attested in Athens one century after the 'Gottesurteil von Mantineia'. The Athenian politician Kallistratos, having been accused of treason, was condemned to death by the Athenians in 361. He fled to Methone and later to Delphi, where he received one of Apollon's puzzling oracles. Should he return to Athens, he would have fair treatment by the laws (av eÀ8n 'A8~vaÇE'tEUSE'tat 'trov VOJ.lOOv).48 So he came back (ca. 356) and took refuge at the altar of the Twelve Gods. Nonetheless, he was put to death by the state, which interpreted the oracle's reference to the fair treatment by the laws as an encouragement to punish the wrongdoer ('to yàp 'trov vOJ.lOOV 'toîç itÔtlCT1KOCH 'tuXEîv 'ttJ.loopta Ècr'ttv' 6 ôÉ YE 8EOÇ op8roç a7tÉÔooKE 'tOîç TtOtlCT1J.lÉvotÇ KoÀucrat 'tov at'ttov).
The aforementioned testimonia imply that on certain occasions authorities -civil authorities-felt themselves encouraged by oracles to disregard the rights of suppliants. A fragmentary lex sacra of the 4th century from Metropolis in Ionia with prescriptions on purity may also be related to this phenomenon. After a series of prohibitions about pollution from sexual intercourse, we find a clause about suppliants: 49 should drag a suppliant away, who/while he sits on an altar." Sokolowski's restoration is tautological. The addition "a suppliant who/while he sits on the altar" is superf1uous, since the word hiketes denotes exactly this action. 51 On the countrary, the right of religious authorities to decide the fate of a suppliant is attested Cinfra). This makes the first restoration preferable, but not certain.
Judicial procedures against suppliant slaves
The evidence presented so far draws the picture of anything but a systematic, uniform, and successful effort to clear up the grievances related with unlimited asylia. Where we hoped to detect general rules, we found ad hoc reactions. This result stands in a marked contrast to the regulations about suppliant slaves. 52 In their case we do find clearcut rules and unequivocal testimonia about the jurisdiction of priests in matters of asylia.
In Athens, at the latest from the classical period on, the Theseion was the preferred refuge of slaves who run away from their masters because of harsh treatment. 53 Their hope was not to change their legal status, Le., to be manumitted, but simply to be resold (1tpâatv ai1:Etv).54 The evidence, reviewed recently by K.A. Christensen, implies that when the master opposed his slave's purchase, a prosecution of the master on a charge of ù~piÇ€tv took place under the supervision of the priests of Theseus. 55 The rôle of the priests in this procedure is not mentioned in the sources regarding Athens, but is clear in the 51 Notice, e.g., that in the Samian inscription quoted below (notes 64-65) the ward i1CÉtllÇ (1. 9, 13, 17) 54 POLL., VII, 13: 0 /)' 01 vûv cpacri tOÙç oiKétaç 1tp&crIV ahEÎv, ËcrtlV EÙPEÎV Èv 'APlcrtOcpa.vouç "Qpalç' Èlloi! Kpa.tlcrt6v ÈcrtlV Eiç ta 011crEÎov /)paIlEÎV,! ÈKEÎ /)', Ëroç av 1tp&O"lV EüProllEV, lléVEIV (fr. 567 K. = 577 Kassel-Austin), &VtIKPUÇ /)' Èv taÎç Eim6ÀI/)oç II6ÀEcrl' KaKà tOla./)E !1ta.crxoucra 1l11/)È 1tp&O"lV aÎtro (fr. 225 K. = 229 Kassel-Austin); PLUT., Mor., 166d: Ëcrtl Kat /)OUÂOIÇ v61l0ç ÈÂEuSEpÎav a.1toyvoûO"\ 1tp&cr\V ai'tEÎcrSal Kat /)Ecr1t6tllV IlEta~a.ÀÂEIV ÈmElKÉcr'tEpOV. Further sources: K.A. CHRISTENSEN, 77Je 77Jeselon: A Slave Refuge at Athens, in AJAH, 9 (1984) Oxford, 1990, p. 263-268. procedure about runaway slaves in the mystery inscription of Andania. 56 The sacred men (iepoO designated an area ta be a refuge for slaves. 57 No persan was allowed ta harbor them, employ them, or offer them food. 58 The priest had the exclusive responsibility in deciding which slave was ta be delivered ta his master (éntKptVetv, KataKptVetv, napalh06vat) . This regulation envisages only slaves From Messene. Runaway slaves From other areas were excluded From this procedure, probably for practical reasons, namely, ta avoid controversies with persans From abroad claiming the ownership of suppliants.59 Sa, the runaway slaves From other areas as weIl as the runaway slaves who were not returned ta their masters were either set free or (more probably) stayed in the sanctuary and served as sacred slaves (cf infra 60 Unfortunately, the text is not clear in this point. The phrase ÈçÉcr~ro~OOI ICUPICOI à1tO~pÉXEIV
Ëxovn can either mean "it shall be permitted for the slave ta flee from the master who owns him" or "it shall be permitted for the master ta run away with the slave in his possesssion": see the discussion in CHRISTENSEN, art. cft. (n. 54), p. 26f. The former interpretation is favoured by LATTE, op. clt. (n. 18), p. 107; cf CHRISTENSEN, al1. cft. (n. 54), p. 27; M.W. MEYER, The Anclent Mysterles: A Sourcebook, New York, 1987, p. 56 ("the fugitive is ta be allowed ta leave the master in charge of him"). The latter Interpretation is accepted by THÜR-TAEUBER, op. clt. (n. 18), p. 220 n. 55 ("er muB den Zugriff des Herm auf den 'verurteilten' Sklaven dulden"); VON WOEB, op. cft. (n. 4), p. 175f. n. 3 suspected that the slave was either resold or returned ta the master, who promised ta treat him better in the future. LATTE, Ibid. also suggested that asylia was the primary root of manumission in the form of dedication ta a deity (tbld., 105-108); cf F. SOKOLOWSKI, The Real Mealling of Sacral Manumission, in HThR, 47 (1954), p. 173-181 ; but see the criticism of F. BOMER, Untersuchungen aber die Religion der SkIaven ln Griechenland und Rom, Wiesbaden 1960, II, p. 14f. with n. 3 and 5. 61 HABICHT, op. cft. (n. 18), op. clt. (n. 18), p. 213 n. 4; SOVERINI, art. cft. (n. 13), p. 84. followed in the case of runaway slaves (1. 9f.: unÈp ' tÔ>V lCa'ta<peuy6v'trov eiç 'to [iepov crroll<l'troV] ). A court (hieron dikasterion?) presided over by the neopoiai 62 interrogated the fugitive slave and his master, and if the master's arguments were stronger, the suppliant slave was given back to him (1. 3-5: napa8t86va[t / 8È 'toîç lCupiotç a1.l't ?]Ô>v, <hav Ènt ' tÔ>V veronotÔ>v 8tlCawÀ.0Y[11/8Év'teç <pavepot c1cr]tv eùyvrollovÉO"'tepa À.Éyov'teç). At the beginning of the preserved fragment (1. 3) king Ptolemy probably refered to a similar procedure in Alexandria which should serve as a mode! for the Samian Heraion. Chr. Habicht is probably right suggesting, e.g., the following restoration: [---lCa86n lCat Èv 'A]À.eSav8petat 8WtlCeî'tat. 63 Another Hellenistic inscription from the Heraion, also published and discussed by Chr. Habicht,64 forbade traders to support suppliants (ilCÉ'tat) and especially suppliant slaves ('toùç lCa8iÇov'taç OilCÉ'taÇ dç 'to iep6v) in any way, e.g., by providing them with food (cf supra, note 58), employing them in their shops, or having transactions with them. 65 Offences against this regulations were probably brought before a hieron dikasterion, which had jurisdiction for offences commited in the sanctuary.66 The slaves, whose masters were found guilty of an offence, may have remained in the Heraion and served as hieroi paides.67 Achilles Tatius explains in his novel Leukippe and Kleitophon the procedure followed in the Artemision of Ephesos. 68 The temple was according to his report accessible only to men, virgins, and runaway female slaves, who were accusing their master of wrongdoings (cf ÈYICCXÂOÛcrCX, àùn.:Ôlv) and assumed the status of suppliants. The case of the slave was decided by a court presided over by magistrates,69 and if the master was found to have committed no injustice against her, he took the woman bac1<:; if not, the suppliant remained in the sanctuary as the goddesses' slave. This explicit evidence for runaway slaves remaining as sacred slaves in the sanctuary where they had found refuge may possibly explain the grave stones of hieroi found near the sanctuary of Poseidon at Tainaron, known to have served as a place of refuge for helots, at least in one instance, i.e., during their great revoIt in the 5th century.7°These sacred slaves may have been runaway helots, who had found asylia in Poseidon's sanctuary.
For the judiciary procedures which decided the fa te of suppliant slaves the literary and documentary sources use unequivocallegal terms, e.g., È7ttlCptVEtv, ICCX'tCXlCptVEtv, ÙtlCcxwÂoyEÎcr8cxt, ÙtlCaÇEtV, ÈYICCXÂEÎV. To this evidence we may add a more problematic testimony, an early legal inscription from Gortyn (early 5th centUlY), which seems to have forbidden the purchase of suppliant slaves (vcxEuovm) for one year (after they had taken refuge in a sanctuary).71 It has been suggested, that this regulation gave the slave and the master the opportunity to come to an arrangement, perhaps with arbitration of the priest. 72 The development of special -and more or less uniform-regulations in the case of suppliant slaves came about for a variety of reasons. In their case the problem was obviously most pressing and, given the significant economic and social implications, a uniform solution was needed urgent/y. In addition, the presence of suppliant slaves in sanctuaries could be easily reconciled with the current divine and secular law. On the one hand, they were not regarded as polluted, and on the other, their supplication did not change their legal condition but only their owner. There is no evidence that they were manumitted; they were either sold to another master, or returned to their owner, or were allowed to stay in the sanctuary as slaves of the god.
Asylla: The right of the 'wronged'
Despite the diverse character of the evidence on limitations of asylia, this evidence supports at least one clear conclusion. At the latest from the early 5th century, asylia and supplication were increasingly becoming claims whieh ought not be respected automatieally, but only after a close examination of each individual case. Sacred and civil authorities responsible for sanctuaries claimed for themselves the right to take the final decision of accepting, rejecting, or expelling suppliants. In the case of slaves, only the vietims of cruel violence were granted the right to remain in the sanctuariesj as D. Daube has pointed out, the supplication of slaves was per se morally justifiable. 73 Similarly, in the case of free persons a distinction seems to have been made between those who sought asylia because they had been wronged (oi âÙt1COUj.lEVOt), and who wanted to avoid further injuries, and those who fled to sanctuaries after a crime, in order to avoid the punishment ordered by secular law. We may notice how often the notion of âÙt1OEîcreat appears in our sources in the context of supplication.7
4 It seems that the emphasis on the idea that a suppliant is the vietim of injustice was relatively recent, attested for the first time in the 5th century. The idea that asylia should not be provided anymore unconditionally and automatically to anyone who had reached a sacred precinct is expressed indirectly also in Attie drama, whieh often presents suppliants explaining why they are seeking asylum and underlining the fact that they have been wronged. They do not simply demand protection secured by divine law, but defend their claim with arguments whieh resemble forensie speeches. 1 reproduce here only Kreousa's advocacy in Euripides' 'Ion': "1 only tlY to slay you, an enemy to my èl.wÛ ptl(: ÀUpcOv). A daim that has to be defended is obviously liable to approval or rejection.7 5 Of decisive importance for our understanding of the reasons why the Greeks changed their attitude toward the unlimited and invariable asyHa is a passage in Thucydides (IV, (97) (98) . The defeated Athenians (424 B.e.) had fortified Apollon's sanctuary at Delion. Theban envoys demanded their departure, appealing to the common Greek custom to abstain from sanctuaries and pointing out that the Athenians were polluting the holy place. In their response the Athenians assumed the position of suppliants explaining that they had not entered the sanctuary with the intent to harm it, but rather in order to defend themselves against those who were wronging them (roùç àÙtKoÛV'tUÇ) from it,76 "Altars are a refuge in cases of involuntary misdeeds ('téov àKO'\)O'troV allup'tllllà'trov), and transgression is a term applied to those who do evil without compulsion and not to those who are driven by misfortunes ta some act of daring."n Thucydides limits the right to asylia to persons who were either wronged or wronged others unwillingly (cf oMÈv OÜ'tE 'tûû ÀOt1tOÛ bc6vreç pÀIX\VEtV; 'trov al(OvO'Îrov allup'tlllllX'trov KU'tUlp'\)Y~V dvut 'toùç ProlloUÇ). Thus he appHes to asylia an important innovation of archaic law, the differentiation betwen intention, responsibility, and accident, attested for the first time in Drakon's laws on homicide.
78 This innovation was gradually, reluctantly, and only sporadically adopted by sacred law, too. A lex sacra from Kleonai from the first half of the 6th century explicitly states that persons who kill in self-defence or who have slain a cursed person are not miaroi; 79 and from the middle of the 4th century, under the influence of this development, the leges sacrae increasingly demand not only the external purity of the body, a purity independent of intentions, but also the purity of the mind. 8o The new understanding of miasma and the transformation of asylia from a protection which is offered automatically and unconditionally, to an institution for which ethical and legal consideration apply, should be seen as part of the same development. In both cases we are dealing with conditions established automatically, as soon as a person performs a certain activity. In both cases, originally, questions of guilt and intention did not play any rôle. In both cases the more differentiated understanding of guilt initiated a significant change. Asylia transformed itself from a right which had to be offered automatically ta any persan who claimed it within a sacred precinct to a privilege which should be granted only if certain moral and legal conditions were fulfilled; similarly miasma was increasingly regarded a state of the mind, and not an automatically transmittable taint.
81 Last1y, in both cases the Greeks remained inconsistent. Relics of the old concepts of asylia and miasma can be found in the literary and documentay sources until imperial times. 
Conclusions
The Greeks were, in general, extremely reluctant about the introduction of laws that might limit or even regulate asylia, probably due to their conviction that divine law is superior to secular authority (cf infra). However, from the late 7th century secular law, especially the legislation on homicide, introduced a fine differentiation in the notion of guilt, which gradually influenced the sacred law. The idea that divine protection could not be offered automatically and invariably ta criminals began ta prevai!. Already in the 5th century we encounter in Euripides and Thucydides the first voices endorsing the view that supplication is the right only of the 'wronged'. From the early 5th century we also find in the documentalY sources indications of an increasing preoccupation with the exploitation of asylia by criminals. The testimonia ( § 2-3) do not reveal a systematic approach to this issue, but rather take the form of exceptional, ad hoc measures to face a situation threatening to get out of control. As we may infer from later sources, these measures (appeal to oracles, impediments against potential intruders) failed to regulate asylia effectively (supra, notes 10 and 15). Gnly in the case of runaway slaves we do find clear and unequivocal rules. The priests (Andania, Athens?) or magistrates (Ephesos, Samos) examined the charges of the slaves against their masters and decided whether a slave was to be returned to the master, resold, or kept in the sanctuary as a sacred slave ( § 4) .
Even the efforts of Greek cities to set certain limits to an institution deeply rooted in religious customs never questioned the supremacy of divine over secular law. This conviction is clearly expressed in the legal sources, e.g., in Lysias, who in his speach against Eratosthenes castigated the thirty tyrants for violating the rights of suppliants, exactly because "they conceived their own authority (àpX~) being more secure (pepalO"CÉpa) than the vengeance of gods."83 Consequently, even the regulations for the limitation of asylia usually had a religious foundation; e.g., they aimed at protecting sanctuaries from pollution, they were approved by oracles, or they engaged religious personnel.
Under these conditions, the bitter criticism of Ion against this divine law (OElVOV ye, Elvll"Coîç "Coùç VO/lO'llç roç où lCa}"ooç ëEllllCev 6 Eleoç) or the threat of the anonymous speaker in Euripides' Oedipus ("Cov vO/lOV xaîpetv Eoov ... , où "CpÉcraç Eleouç) seem, at first sight, to break the constraints respected by the Greeks. This impression is, however, misleading. In the further development of the Ion (perhaps also of the Oedipus) a surprise awaits the protagonist. Had Ion violated the asylum, he would have killed -unknowingly-his own mother. 84 A seemingly logical and just regulation would have allowed Ion to committ the worst crime, matricide, it would have opened the way to an even greater injustice. Here, too, the divine law reveals itself superior to human considerations, and the insight of the changable and unpredictable fate of men impedes the restriction of one of the most humane institutions of the Greeks. Demophon's reaction to the herolds demand to deliver suppliants).
84 BURNETI, art. cif. (n. 3), p. 99 and n. 36 (Ion "delivers his speech against the sacred nomos of asylum in circumstances arranged to demonstrate the enormity of his attempt to judge what heaven has established, for the audience knows that if he follows his secular sense of justice and breaks the 'senseless' divine law he will cause the death of his own mother"); MIKALSON, op. clf. (n. 2), p. 75.
